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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-1798 
___________ 
 
VAMSIDHAR REDDY VURIMINDI, 
   Appellant 
v. 
 
WYETH PHARMACEUTICALS, (PFIZER); ACCENTURE; MEDFOCUS;  
STEPHEN KOPKO; ROBERT MOYER 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 10-cv-00386) 
District Judge:  Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 11, 2011 
Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
             (Opinion filed:  October 12, 2011)  
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM.  
   In December 2009, Appellant, Vamsidhar Vurimindi, commenced this 
action in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County against defendants Wyeth 
Pharmaceuticals (Pfizer), MedFocus (Inventive Clinical Solutions), Accenture, Stephen 
Kopko and Robert Moyer.  In the complaint, Vurimindi, who had worked with the 
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defendants in various capacities, claimed that they had violated the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 by harassing him, sabotaging his work, and conspiring to tarnish his reputation.  
The complaint also included several state-law tort claims.  The defendants subsequently 
removed the complaint to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1441.        
  In August 2010, Vurimindi filed an amended complaint asserting the same 
federal claims as well as the following state-law claims against the defendants: breach of 
contract, wrongful termination, slander, fraud and misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, 
and interference with economic relationship.  Soon thereafter, the defendants moved to 
dismiss the amended complaint on various grounds.  Vurimindi then sought leave to 
amend the complaint a second time in order to withdraw his federal claims and assert 
additional state-law claims.
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  By order entered March 23, 2011, the District Court dismissed the amended 
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.  The court explained that, because Vurimindi 
consented to withdraw his federal claims, it no longer had federal question jurisdiction 
over the complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and could not otherwise retain original 
jurisdiction because diversity of citizenship was lacking, see id. § 1332.  The court 
recognized that it had the authority to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining 
state-law claims, see id. § 1367, but determined that doing so would not serve any “useful 
                                              
1
 Specifically, Vurimindi sought leave to assert claims for promissory estoppel and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.  
3 
 
purpose.”  Therefore, the court dismissed the amended complaint and denied Vurimindi 
leave to file a second amended complaint asserting additional state-law claims.  
Vurimindi now appeals from the District Court’s order.2    
  We will affirm.  The District Court properly concluded that, because 
Vurimindi withdrew his federal claims,
3
 it no longer possessed subject matter jurisdiction 
over the matter.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Moreover, the court acted within its discretion in 
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, 
including those presented in the proposed second amended complaint.  See Borough of 
West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[W]here the claim over 
which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court 
must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial 
economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for 
doing so.”)  The matter is remanded to the District Court with directions that the case be 
returned to state court. 
 
                                              
2
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
3
 Although Vurimindi includes in his brief argument in support of his federal civil 
rights claims, his motion for leave to file a second amended complaint makes clear that 
he intended to withdraw those claims.     
